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Abstract
In this paper we propose a game-theoretic model to analyze events similar to the 2009 DARPA Net-
work Challenge, which was organized by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) for
exploring the roles that the Internet and social networks play in incentivizing wide-area collaborations.
The challenge was to form a group that would be the first to find the locations of ten moored weather
balloons across the United States. We consider a model in which N people (who can form groups) are
located in some topology with a fixed coverage volume around each person’s geographical location. We
consider various topologies where the players can be located such as the Euclidean d-dimension space
and the vertices of a graph. A balloon is placed in the space and a group wins if it is the first one to report
the location of the balloon. A larger team has a higher probability of finding the balloon, but we assume
that the prize money is divided equally among the team members. Hence there is a competing tension to
keep teams as small as possible.
Risk aversion is the reluctance of a person to accept a bargain with an uncertain payoff rather than
another bargain with a more certain, but possibly lower, expected payoff. In our model we consider
the isoelastic utility function derived from the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion. The main
aim is to analyze the structures of the groups in Nash equilibria for our model. For the d-dimensional
Euclidean space (d ≥ 1) and the class of bounded degree regular graphs we show that in any Nash
Equilibrium the richest group (having maximum expected utility per person) covers a constant fraction
of the total volume. The objective of events like the DARPA Network Challenge is to mobilize a large
number of people quickly so that they can cover a big fraction of the total area. Our results suggest that
this objective can be met under certain conditions.
1 Introduction
With the advent of communication technologies, and the Web in particular, we can now harness the col-
lective abilities of large groups of people to accomplish tasks with unprecedented speed, accuracy, and
scale. In the popular culture and the business literature, this process has come to be known as crowdsourc-
ing [11]. Crowdsourcing has been used in various tasks such as labeling of images [23], predicting protein
structures [6], and posting and solving Human Intelligence Tasks in Amazon’s Mechanical Turk [19]. An
important class of crowdsourcing problems demand a large recruitment along with an extremely fast ex-
ecution. Examples of such time-critical social mobilization tasks include search-and-rescue operations in
the times of disasters, evacuation in the event of terrorist attacks, and distribution of medicines during epi-
demics. For example, in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, amateur radio volunteers played an important
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role by coordinating dispatch of emergency services to isolated areas [13]. “Collaboratition” [15] is a newly
coined term to describe a type of crowdsourcing used for those problems which require a collaborative
effort to be successful, but use competition as a motivator for the participation or the performance.
The DARPA Network Challenge: A good example of collaboratition is The 2009 DARPA Network
Challenge [1], an event organized by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) for explor-
ing the roles that the Internet and social networks play in incentivizing wide-area collaborations. Collabora-
tion of efforts was required to complete the challenge quickly and in addition to the competitive motivation
of the contest as a whole, the winning team from MIT established what they called a “collaborapetitive”
environment to generate participations in their team and found all the ten balloons in less than seven hours.
Their strategy in Pickard et al. [18]. Their main focus is on the mechanics of the group formation process in
the DARPA Network Challenge, whereas in this paper we try to analyze the structures of the groups which
form in Nash Equilibria.
Related Work: Douceur and Moscibroda [8] addressed a problem close to the spirit of the DARPA
Network Challenge. They address the problem of motivating people to install and run a distributed service,
like peer-to-peer systems, in which the decision and the effort to install a service falls to the individuals
rather than to a central planner. Their paper appeared in 2007; two years before the DARPA Network
Challenge took place. Their focus is on incentivizing the growth of a single group whereas in this paper we
take a bird’s-eye view and try to analyze the structures of the groups in Nash equilibria.
In this paper we focus on analyzing the structures of the groups in Nash equilibria for our model. Some
recent results analyze the structures of Nash Equilibria. Some upper and lower bounds are given on the
diameter of the Equilibrium graphs in Basic Network Creation Games [2]. It was also shown that the equi-
librium graphs have polylogarithmic diameter in Cooperative Network Creation Games [7]. A well-studied
parameter related to Nash equilibria is the price of anarchy [12, 17, 21], which is the worst possible ratio
of the total cost found by independent selfish behavior and the optimal total cost possible by a centralized,
social welfare maximizing solution. However as observed in [2, 7], bounds on the structures of Nash equi-
libria lead to approximate bounds on the price of anarchy as well but not necessarily the other way around.
Therefore trying to analyze the structures of the groups in Nash equilibria is more general than trying to
bound the price of anarchy.
Myerson [16] used graph-theoretic ideas to model and analyze games with partial cooperation struc-
tures. The DARPA Network Challenge is also similar as any groups can possibly form but the geographical
locations of the people causes certain group structures to become infeasible. There is an entire body of lit-
erature in Economics which is closely related to the model we consider in this paper. There have also been
studies on how the rules of coalition formation affect the stability of environmental agreements between
countries [9]. Their rules for leaving or entering the coalitions are very similar to the ones we consider
in this paper for formation or splitting of the groups. Risk aversion is a natural assumption to make while
modeling the behavior of humans. There is a recent paper [4] which gives efficient algorithms for computing
truthful mechanisms for risk-averse sellers. Another paper [3] considers scenarios in which the goal is to
ensure that information propagates through a large network of nodes. They assume a model where all nodes
have the required information to compete which removes the incentive to propagate information. In this pa-
per, we consider the natural assumption of risk aversion which gives a concave utility function (derived from
the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion). This motivates formation of groups which is consistent
with what was observed in the DARPA Challenge. Another paper [5] considers the problem of acquiring
information in a strategic networked environment. They show that in the DARPA Network Challenge, the
idea to offer split contracts instead of fixed-payment contracts is robust against the selfishness displayed by
the participating agents.
2
Organization of the paper: In Section 2 we describe our model in detail. Then we consider various
topologies where our model can be implemented: the one-dimensional (line) space (in Section 4), and
more generally the d-dimensional Euclidean space (in Section 5). For both these topologies, in any Nash
Equilibrium we show that there always exists a group covering a constant fraction of the total volume. In
Section 6 we consider the discrete version of the our model, where the players form the vertices of an
undirected graph. For the class of bounded-degree regular graphs, we prove that in any Nash Equilibrium
there always exists a group covering a constant fraction of the total number of vertices. In contrast, under
an assumption that defecting to an empty group is prohibited, we show for every constant 0 < c < 1 there
exist graphs which have a Nash Equilibrium where all groups occupy strictly less than a c-fraction of the
total number of vertices.
2 Our Model
We assume there is a set of N players, each covering a region of space within the total volume A. In particular,
in the Euclidean space, we assume each player covers a ball of radius one centered at his location; in the
discrete case we view the players as occupying the vertices of a graph and assume each player covers himself
and his neighbors.
Players are allowed to organize themselves into a collection of disjoint groups partitioning the set of
players. In this work, we do not consider the precise dynamics of group formation, but instead we focus
on analyzing the structures of the groups in Nash equilibria. Once the groups are formed, we envision the
balloon being placed in the space. We say the balloon falls within a group S if the location of the balloon
is in the coverage of S; a group S wins if it is the first one to report the location of the balloon. To model
this we assume the probability that the balloon falls within a group S is AS/A, where AS is the total volume
covered by the players in S and A is the total volume. The prize money M is given to the group that wins,
and the money received by a group is split equally among all members of that group. We note the balloon
can be placed anywhere in the space, and we do not know where it will be placed. Hence the probability
of any of the groups (which might form) finding the balloon first is the same and we do not consider this
common factor hereafter.
Risk aversion [10, 14, 22, 20] is a concept in psychology, economics, and finance, based on the behavior
of humans (especially consumers and investors) whilst exposed to uncertainty. Risk aversion is the reluc-
tance of a person to accept a bargain with an uncertain payoff rather than another bargain with a more certain,
but possibly lower, expected payoff [20]. Risk aversion is a natural assumption when we consider money
and people: most of us would accept a guaranteed payment of say X dollars than a 50% chance of receiving
2X and a 50% chance of getting nothing, especially if X is large (the DARPA Challenge had a prize money
of $40,000). Constant relative risk aversion means that the ratio of the increase in the utility to the increase
in the risk taken is constant. Assuming that the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion is constant, the
isoelastic utility function for money x is given by u(x) = x
1−r
1−r where 0≤ r< 1 is the risk aversion factor [10].
For r = 1 we take the utility to be the natural logarithm. Here r = 0 means there is no risk aversion. For
simplicity we scale up everything by a factor of 1− r to get a concave utility function given by u(x) = x1−r
where 0 < r < 1. The expected utility for a player who is a member of a group S is given by p(S) · u(M|S|),
where p(S) = ASA is the probability that the balloon fall within S. Consider two players who have disjoint area
of coverage. If they are on their own, then their expected utility is u = ( |M|1 )
1−r · aA wherea is the area they
can cover. If they join together to form a group then their expected utility is u′ = ( |M|2 )
1−r · 2aA = 2r · u > u
since 1> r> 0. Therefore two people whose coverage areas are disjoint will always join together, not matter
what the risk aversion factor r is. The intuition is that the value of r affects how much overlapping coverage
areas is allowed for it to be beneficial for people to join together. The smaller the value of r the lesser the
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overlap must be between the coverage areas of the players for it to make sense for them to merge.
We assume that the balloon is placed in a location covered by at least one player. Given a partition
S1, . . . ,S` of all the players into groups, we now ask whether it forms an equilibrium. More formally, we
allow two types of actions:
1. Two groups Si and S j can decide to merge. We say this operation is incentivized only if each player in
Si and S j would increase their expected utility by merging.
2. A member x of group Si may defect to join a different group S j. We say this operation is incentivized
only if both x’s expected utility and the expected utility of each player in S j increase after the defect.
We say a given partition is a Nash Equilibrium if no merge or defect operation is incentivized, i.e., no
player can do better by unilaterally changing his group. We could consider a generalized defect operation
where a subset of a group Si may leave to join a group S j. However for the sake of clarity (while still
capturing the essence of the model), we consider the defect operation where at a given time only a single
person can leave his current group to join a new group.
3 Lower Bounds on the Total Prize Money
In this paper we consider the social welfare from the viewpoint of the agency which hosts the event described
by our model.We now show that the hosting agency needs to offer prize money proportional to the desired
size of a largest group or to the desired fraction of the total volume covered if each person must receive a
minimum threshold expected utility.
Theorem 3.1. [?] If there exists a Nash Equilibrium in which at least one group S covers a λ -fraction
of the total volume, and each player in S covers volume V and has an expected utility of at least c, then
M ≥ λAc 11−r .
Theorem 3.2. [?] If there exists a Nash Equilibrium in which there is at least one group S of size k, and
each player in S covers volume V and has an expected utility of at least c, then M ≥ k
(
cA
N
) 1
1−r
.
In the rest of the paper the total prize money M is not important as we just compare the expected utilities
of various group structures to see which ones form Nash equilibria, and hence M cancels out. However the
above two theorems imply the hosting agency must spend money M which depends on c and therefore M
cannot be arbitrarily small.
4 The One-Dimensional (Line) Case
In this section the players are located along a line. We show for any Nash Equilibrium there is at least one
group covering a constant fraction (depending on the risk aversion factor r) of the total length We assume
each person has a coverage length of one on both sides. Recall for each person x in a group S the expected
utility is E[u(x)] =
(
M
|S|
)1−r
· ASA where M is the total money, AS is the length covered by group S and A is
the total length. We contract the points not covered by any player. Therefore every point in the total length
has at least one person whose coverage length contains it.
Lemma 4.1. For the line case, let S be a richest group in a Nash Equilibrium. Then there is no player i /∈ S
who can add a length of at least 2(1− r) to the length AS currently covered by S.
The proofs of the results labeled with ? have been deferred to the Appendix
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Proof. Suppose there is a player i /∈ S, who can add a length of at least 2(1− r) to the length covered by
S. However, since it is a Nash Equilibrium, either the new expected utility of S on adding this player is less
than or equal to the current expected utility of S (hence S would have no incentive in adding the player i) or
the player i would not have any incentive to move to S, as the projected new expected utility of i is less than
or equal to his current expected utility. Since S is a richest group, both these conditions combine to give:( M
|S|+1
)1−r
· AS+2(1− r)
A
≤
(M
|S|
)1−r
· AS
A
(1)
As each player has a coverage length of two we have 2|S| ≥ AS (equality holds only if the coverage lengths
of the members of S are pairwise disjoint). The function f (x) = xx+1 is increasing on (0,∞) and hence
|S|
|S|+1 ≥ ββ+1 where β = AS2 . Combining with Equation 1 gives( β
β +1
)1−r
≤
( |S|
|S|+1
)1−r
≤ AS
AS+2(1− r)
Rearranging and setting 1− r = 1t implies
AS+2(1− r)
AS
≤
(β +1
β
) 1
t
=⇒
(
1+
2(1− r)
AS
)t
≤ 1+ 1
β
Bernoulli’s inequality states if x,q ∈ R and x > −1,q > 1 then (1+ x)q > 1+ qx. Applying the inequality
for x = 2(1−r)AS and q = t =
1
1−r > 1 gives
1+
1
β
= 1+
2t(1− r)
AS
<
(
1+
2(1− r)
AS
)t
≤ 1+ 1
β
which is a contradiction.
Definition 4.2. Given a partition of the people into groups, we say a group G is a richest group if its
expected utility per person value is at least that of any other group in the partition.
We note that given any partition of people into groups, there always exists at least one richest group. We
show the following interesting and unexpected phenomenon: in every Nash Equilibrium any richest group
covers a constant fraction of the total volume.
Theorem 4.3. For the line case, in any Nash Equilibrium there is always a group which covers a constant
fraction of the total length where the constant is 11+2(1−r) .
Proof. We refer to Figure 1 for the notation used in this proof. Given a Nash Equilibrium, consider any
richest group S. Since we contracted the points not covered by anybody, a player x /∈ S has coverage length
starting from the leftmost point of EL or EL might be empty. If EL is not empty then |EL| ≤ 2(1− r) else
x contradicts Lemma 4.1. In either case |EL| ≤ 2(1− r). Similarly there is a player y /∈ S whose coverage
length ends at the rightmost point of ER or ER is empty. In either case |ER| ≤ 2(1−r). Claim is |I j| ≤ 4(1−r)
for 1 ≤ j ≤ m− 1. Suppose ∃ j such that |I j| > 4(1− r). The midpoint of I j must be covered by a player
z /∈ S and so this z covers at least half of I j, i.e., z can offer greater than 2(1−r) length to S which contradicts
Lemma 4.1. Also |S j| ≥ 2 for all 1≤ j ≤ m as each S j is a concatenation of the coverage lengths of one or
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more members of S. Therefore |AS|= ∑mj=1 |S j| ≥ 2m and
|A|=
m
∑
j=1
|S j|+
m−1
∑
j=1
|I j|+ |EL|+ |ER|
≤
m
∑
j=1
|S j|+
(
4(m−1)(1− r)
)
+2(1− r)+2(1− r)
≤
m
∑
j=1
|S j|+4(1− r)m
≤
m
∑
j=1
|S j|+2(1− r)
m
∑
j=1
|S j|
=
(
1+2(1− r)
)( m
∑
j=1
|S j|
)
Thus
|AS|
|A| =
∑mj=1 |S j|
|A| ≥
1
1+2(1− r) , i.e., the group S covers a constant fraction of the total length.
EL ER I1 
S1 S2 
Im-1 I2 
Sm 
A 
Figure 1: The segments covered by S are S1,S2, . . . ,Sm. The internal gaps are I1, I2, . . . , Im−1. The left and
right external gaps are EL and ER respectively. The total length A stretches from the left endpoint of EL to
the right endpoint of ER
5 The Euclidean d-dimensional Case
In this section we consider the case in which the players are located in a Euclidean d-dimensional space and
each person covers a unit ball around himself. The next lemma bounds the ratio of volumes of the union of
the two families of balls with the same set of centers but different radii.
Lemma 5.1. Let A be a finite family of balls of radius one in a Euclidean d-dimensional space. Let B be a
family of balls with the same set of the centers but radius t ≥ 1. Let AU ,BU denote the union of balls in A
and B respectively. Then Vol(BU) ≤ td · Vol(AU) where Vol(AU),Vol(BU) denotes the volume of AU and BU
respectively.
Proof. Let C = {c1,c2, . . . ,cn} be the centers of the balls in A. For x ∈ BU define c(x) =min{ d(c j,x) | 1≤
j ≤ n }. Consider the partition P1,P2, . . . ,Pn of BU into n parts: x ∈ BU is placed in Pi if and only if i =
min{ j | d(x,c j) = c(x) }.
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We claim y ∈ Pj implies [c j,y] ∈ Pj. Suppose there is a point z ∈ [c j,y] such that z ∈ Pk for k 6= j. By the
triangle inequality d(ck,y) ≤ d(ck,z)+ d(z,y) ≤ d(c j,z)+ d(z,y) = d(c j,y) where we used z ∈ Pk implies
d(ck,z)≤ d(c j,z). So d(ck,y)≤ d(c j,y). But y∈ Pj implies d(ck,y) = d(c j,y), d(ck,z) = d(c j,z) and j< k.
This contradicts the membership of z in Pk. So we can apply homothecy: for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n we contract
each Pi w.r.t point ci by a factor of 1t to get a region say P
′
i . We note P
′
i ⊆ AU as x∈ Pi implies d(x,ci)≤ t and
if we denote by x′ the point to which x is mapped under the contraction, then d(x′,ci) = 1t ·d(x,ci)≤ 1t ·t = 1.
The next claim is P′i ∩P′j = /0 for any i 6= j. Suppose not and say y ∈ P′i ∩P′j. Let yi,y j be the points in
Pi and Pj respectively which get mapped to y under the contraction. Let d(c j,y) = α and d(ci,y) = β . By
the triangle inequality we have d(ci,y j)≤ d(ci,y)+d(y,y j) = β +(t−1)α . Also y j ∈ Pj implies d(ci,y j)≥
d(c j,y j) = tα . So β +(t− 1)α ≥ d(ci,y j) ≥ d(c j,y j) ≥ tα , i.e., β ≥ α . Similarly we have α ≥ β which
implies α = β . Therefore tα = d(c j,y j)≤ d(ci,y j)≤ d(ci,y)+d(y,y j) = β+(t−1)α = tα . Equality in the
triangle inequality gives ci,y j,yi are on the same line and d(ci,y j) = d(ci,yi) which implies yi = y j which is
a contradiction. So we have the following two conditions :
1. P′i ⊆ AU for every 1≤ i≤ n.
2. P′i ∩P′j = /0 for any i 6= j.
Therefore, Vol(AU) ≥ ∑ni=1 Vol(P′i ) = 1td ·∑ni=1 Vol(Pi) = 1td · Vol(BU). We note the bound is tight when all
the balls in B are disjoint.
We now prove a generalization of Lemma 4.1 for a Euclidean d-dimensional space. Let Vd denote the
volume of a unit ball in the Euclidean d-dimensional space.
Lemma 5.2. Let S be a richest group in a Nash Equilibrium. There is no player i /∈ S who can add a volume
of at least (1− r)Vd to the volume AS currently covered by S.
Proof. Suppose there is a player i /∈ S, who can add a volume of at least (1− r)Vd to the volume covered
by S. However, since it is a Nash Equilibrium, either the new expected utility of S on adding this player is
less than or equal to the current expected utility of S, hence S would have no incentive in adding the player
i. Or else the player i would not have any incentive to move to S, as the projected new expected utility of i
is less than or equal to his current expected utility. Since S is a richest group, both these conditions combine
to give: ( M
|S|+1
)1−r
· AS+(1− r)Vd
A
≤
(M
|S|
)1−r
· AS
A
(2)
As each player has a coverage volume of Vd we have |S|Vd ≥ AS (with equality only if the coverage volumes
of the members of S are pairwise disjoint). The function f (x) = xx+1 is increasing on (0,∞) and hence
|S|
|S|+1 ≥ ββ+1 where β = ASVd . Combining with Equation 2 gives( β
β +1
)1−r
≤
( |S|
|S|+1
)1−r
≤ AS
AS+(1− r)Vd
Rearranging and setting 1− r = 1t implies
AS+(1− r)Vd
AS
≤
(β +1
β
) 1
t
=⇒
(
1+
(1− r)Vd
AS
)t
≤ 1+ 1
β
Bernoulli’s inequality states if x,q ∈ R and x > −1,q > 1 then (1+ x)q > 1+ qx. Applying the inequality
for x = (1−r)VdAS and q = t =
1
1−r > 1 gives
1+
1
β
= 1+
t(1− r)Vd
AS
<
(
1+
(1− r)Vd
AS
)t
≤ 1+ 1
β
which is a contradiction.
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We first give a simple proof that if S is any richest group in a Nash Equilibrium then ASA ≥ 13d where AS
is the volume covered by the group S and A is the total volume.
Theorem 5.3. If the players are located in a d-dimensional Euclidean space then in any Nash Equilibrium
every richest group covers at least a 13d -fraction of the total volume.
Proof. Let S be a richest group in a Nash Equilibrium and consider a player x /∈ S. There must exist a
member of s ∈ S such that the distance between x and s is at most two. Otherwise the coverage ball of x is
disjoint from the coverage ball of S and thus can contribute a volume of Vd > (1− r)Vd which contradicts
Lemma 5.2. So the total volume A is covered by the volume A′S of the union of the family of balls of radius
three centered at the members of S. By Lemma 5.1 we have
AS
A
≥ AS
A′S
≥ 1
3d
.
The above bound of 13d is independent of the risk aversion factor r. We now give a better bound which
depends on r. To this end, in the following lemma, we show how to bound the volume of intersection of two
unit balls in a Euclidean d-dimensional space in terms of the distance between their centers.
Lemma 5.4. Let B1 and B2 be two unit balls in a Euclidean d−dimensional space. For a ≤ 1, if the
distance between the centers of B1 and B2 is 2a, then the volume of intersection of B1 and B2 is at most
2(1−a2) d−12 ·Vd−1 where Vd−1 is the volume of a unit ball in a Euclidean (d−1)-dimensional space.
Proof. We assume a ≤ 1 otherwise the area of intersection is clearly zero. Let c1,c2 be the centers of B1
and B2 respectively. Then B1 ∩B2 is contained in the cylinder (say B) of radius
√
1−a2 and height 2a
centered at the midpoint of the segment joining c1 and c2. So Vol(B1∩B2)≤ Vol(B) = 2a(1−a2) d−12 Vd−1 ≤
2(1−a2) d−12 ·Vd−1 as a≤ 1.
The next lemma gives a lower bound on the ratio of the volumes of unit balls in Euclidean spaces of
consecutive dimensions.
Lemma 5.5. For d ≥ 2 let Vd−1,Vd be the volumes of unit balls in the d−1 and d−dimensional Euclidean
spaces respectively. Then VdVd−1 ≥ 1d .
Proof. We prove by induction on d. Base case is d=2 and V2V1 =
pi
2 ≥ 12 . We use the well-known recurrence
relation for Vn: Vn = 2pin ·Vn−2. Suppose the hypothesis is true for all k ≤ n− 1. Then we have VnVn−1 =
n−1
n · Vn−2Vn−3 ≥ n−1n · 1n−2 > 1n and so the hypothesis holds true for all d ≥ 2.
We are now ready to give a better bound than 13d on the fraction of the total volume covered by any
richest group in a Nash Equilibrium.
Theorem 5.6. If the players are located in a d-dimensional Euclidean space, then in any Nash Equilibrium
there always is a group which covers at least a 1
(2δ+1)d -fraction of the total volume where δ =
√
1− ( r2d )
2
d−1 .
We note 1
(2δ+1)d >
1
3d as δ < 1 and therefore this improves on Theorem 5.3.
Proof. Consider a richest group S in a Nash Equilibrium. By Lemma 5.2, no player outside of S can get his
coverage ball to contribute at least (1− r)Vd volume to S, i.e, for every x /∈ S there is a player s ∈ S such
that volume of intersection of balls Bx,Bs of x and s respectively is at least rVd . Let the distance between
centers of Bx and Bs be 2a. Lemma 5.4 gives 2(1− a2) d−12 Vd−1 ≥ Vol(Bs ∩ Bx) ≥ r ·Vd which implies
2(1− a2) d−12 ≥ r VdVd−1 ≥ rd by Lemma 5.5. Rearranging we get a ≤
√
1− ( r2d )
2
d−1 = say δ . So each player
not in S is at a distance of at most 2δ from some player of S. Therefore the total volume A is covered by the
volume A′S of the union of the family of balls of radius 2δ +1 centered at members of S. By Lemma 5.1 we
have ASA ≥ ASA′S ≥
1
(2δ+1)d .
8
6 The Graph Case
In this section we consider the discrete version of the problem where players form the vertex set of an
undirected graph. The coverage of a vertex is its closed neighborhood, i.e., a vertex covers itself and all
its neighbors. We assume the same utility function as before: Each member x belonging to a group S has
expected utility given by E[u(x)] =
(
M
|S|
)1−r
· |AS||A| where M is the total money, AS is the union of the closed
neighborhoods of the vertices in S and A is the vertex set of the graph. We first show a preliminary lemma
which bounds the contribution to a richest group in a Nash Equilibrium by any vertex which is not in the
richest group. This lemma can be viewed as a discrete version of Lemma 5.2.
Lemma 6.1. Let G = (V,E) be an undirected graph with maximum degree ∆. Let S be a richest group in a
Nash Equilibrium. Then there is no player i /∈ AS who can add at least (1− r)(∆+1) vertices to the set AS
currently covered by S.
Proof. Suppose a player i /∈ AS can add at least (1− r)(∆+ 1) vertices to the set AS currently covered by
S. However, since it is a Nash Equilibrium, either the new expected utility of S on adding this player is less
than or equal to the current expected utility of S, hence S would have no incentive in adding the player i.
Or else the player i would not have any incentive to move to S, as the projected new expected utility of i is
less than or equal to its current expected utility. Since S is a richest group, both these conditions combine to
give: ( M
|S|+1
)1−r
· AS+(1− r)(∆+1)
A
≤
(M
|S|
)1−r
· AS
A
(3)
As each player has degree at most ∆we have |S|(∆+1)≥ AS (with equality only if the closed neighborhoods
of the vertices of S are pairwise disjoint). Since f (x) = xx+1 is an increasing function we have
|S|
|S|+1 ≥ ββ+1
where β = AS∆+1 . Combining with Equation 3 gives( β
β +1
)1−r
≤
( |S|
|S|+1
)1−r
≤ AS
AS+(1− r)(∆+1)
Rearranging and setting 1− r = 1t implies
AS+(1− r)(∆+1)
AS
≤
(β +1
β
) 1
t
=⇒
(
1+
(1− r)(∆+1)
AS
)t
≤ 1+ 1
β
Bernoulli’s inequality states if x,q ∈ R and x > −1,q > 1 then (1+ x)q > 1+ qx. Applying the inequality
for x = (1−r)(∆+1)AS and q = t =
1
1−r > 1 gives
1+
1
β
= 1+
t(1− r)(∆+1)
AS
<
(
1+
(1− r)(∆+1)
AS
)t
≤ 1+ 1
β
which is a contradiction.
In the next theorem we show if the topology is the class of bounded-degree regular graphs, then in
any Nash Equilibrium there always exists a group which covers a constant fraction of the total number of
vertices.
Theorem 6.2. Let G = (A,E) be a f -regular graph. In any Nash Equilibrium there always exists a group
covering a constant fraction of the total number of vertices where the constant is
1
f−1
r( f+1) +1
.
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Proof. Consider a richest group S in a Nash Equilibrium. Let AS be the vertices covered by S, i.e, AS is the
union of the closed neighborhoods of the vertices of S. Denote by AS the set A \AS. Since the graph is f -
regular the size of the closed neighborhood of every vertex is f +1. By Lemma 6.1, every vertex x /∈ AS must
add less than (1−r)( f +1) vertices to the set AS. So each vertex in AS has at least ( f +1)−(1−r)( f +1) =
r( f + 1) neighbors in AS. Let β be the number of edges with one endpoint in AS and one endpoint in AS.
Thus β ≥ r|AS|( f + 1). By the definition of AS as the union of the closed neighborhoods of vertices of S,
only the vertices from AS \S can have edges to AS. Each vertex of AS \S has at least one neighbor in S and so
β ≤ |AS|( f −1). Combining the two bounds we have |AS|( f −1)≥ β ≥ r|AS|( f +1) = r(|A|−|AS|)( f +1).
Letting µ = f−1r( f+1) we have µ|AS| ≥ |A|− |AS|, i.e.,
|AS|
|A| ≥
1
µ+1
=
1
f−1
r( f+1) +1
The general graph case does not seem to be hopeful. Recall in all the three topologies (the one-
dimensional (line) space, the d-dimensional Euclidean space and the bounded-degree regular graphs) con-
sidered so far, we were able to show the surprising phenomenon that any richest group in a Nash Equilibrium
covers a constant fraction of the total volume/vertices. We show this approach fails for general graphs, i.e.,
there exist graphs having a Nash Equilibrium in which no richest group covers a constant fraction of the
total number of vertices.
Theorem 6.3. There exist graphs which have a Nash Equilibrium in which no richest group covers a con-
stant fraction of the total number of vertices.
Proof. Consider the family of graphs Gz where z is a parameter satisfying the equation(M
1
)1−r
· 12z
r
|Gz| >
(M
2
)1−r
· 12z
r +4
|Gz| , i.e., z
r >
1
3(21−r−1) (4)
We now describe the graph Gz: it contains a clique K of size 12zr. We say these vertices are of Type I. A
path P of length 3z is attached to a vertex (say v) of Type I. We call the vertices of the path P (excluding v)
as the vertices of Type II.
First we show no two vertices x,y of Type I merge. If v /∈ {x,y} then x and y will not merge as they
both have the same coverage. So without loss of generality let x = v. Then the initial expected utility of
y is
(M
1
)1−r
· 12z
r
|Gz| and the expected utility of the group {x,y} is
(M
2
)1−r
· 12z
r +1
|Gz| . Equation 4 implies(M
1
)1−r
· 12z
r
|Gz| >
(M
2
)1−r
· 12z
r +4
|Gz| >
(M
2
)1−r
· 12z
r +1
|Gz| . Hence no two vertices of Type I merge.
We next show no vertex p of Type I merges with a vertex q of Type II. The initial expected utility of p
is at least
(M
1
)1−r
· 12z
r
|Gz| with equality if p 6= v. The expected utility of the group {p,q} will be at most(M
2
)1−r
· 12z
r +4
|Gz| as any vertex of Type II can add at most 3 vertices to coverage of a vertex of Type I.
Equation 4 implies no vertex of Type I will merge with a vertex of Type II.
So a group in any Nash Equilibrium has to either be a single vertex of Type I or a set of Type II vertices.
In the first case the maximum expected utility will be for the group formed by v alone and is given by(M
1
)1−r
· 12z
r +1
|Gz| = say U1 (5)
For the second case if the group consist of b vertices of Type II then the expected utility of this group is(
M
b
)1−r
· C|Gz| =say U2 where C is the coverage of the group. The coverage of any vertex of Type II is at
most three implies C ≤ 3b with equality only if the coverages of the members of the group are pairwise
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disjoint. So U2 =
(
M
b
)1−r
· C|Gz| ≤
(
M
b
)1−r
· 3b|Gz| = (M)1−r · 3b
r
|Gz| ≤ (M)1−r ·
3(3z)r
|Gz| <
(
M
1
)1−r
· 12zr+1|Gz| =U1 as
b≤ 3z and r ∈ (0,1). Therefore the only richest group in any Nash Equilibrium in Gz is the group {v}. The
fraction of vertices covered by v is 12z
r+1
12zr+3z <
12zr+3zr(21−r−1)
12zr+3z =
4+(21−r−1)
4+z1−r =
3+21−r
3+z1−r which tends to 0 as we
increase z since r ∈ (0,1) (Equation 4 only imposed a lower bound on z and hence there is no issue with
increasing z arbitrarily). So there exist graphs which have a Nash Equilibrium in which no richest group
covers a constant fraction of the total number of vertices.
Theorem 6.3 implies we need different techniques than the ones used above to resolve the general graph
case. However, under the assumption that defection to an empty group is not allowed, we can show given
any constant c < 1 there exists a graph Gc and a Nash Equilibrium in Gc such that each group in the
Nash Equilibrium covers strictly less than a c-fraction of the total number of vertices. We now explicitly
construct such graphs. Consider the family of graphs Gk,`: it has a clique of size k formed by the vertices
{v1,v2, . . . ,vk}. We call these vertices as the primary vertices. Each primary vertex vi has ` leaves attached
to it. We denote these secondary vertices attached to the primary vertex vi by L(vi) = {vi,1,vi,2, . . . ,vi,`}.
We note |Gk,`|= k+ k`.
Lemma 6.4. If k and ` satisfy
k > `
(2− f (`)
f (`)−1
)
where f (`) =
(
1+
1
`+1
)1−r
(6)
then the groups S1,S2, . . . ,Sk defined by Si = L(vi)∪{vi} form a Nash Equilibrium for the graph Gk,`.
Proof. The function g(x) = 2−xx−1 is decreasing in the interval (1,2
1−r). Also f (`)< 21−r implies
g(21−r)< g( f (`)) , i.e., g(21−r) =
2−21−r
21−r−1 <
2− f (`)
f (`)−1 <
k
`
(7)
where the last step follows from Equation 6. The quantity g(21−r) is a constant and we denote it by say γ .
We show no two of the groups S1,S2, . . . ,Sk will merge. The current expected utility of any Si is(
M
`+1
)1−r
· k+`k+k` = say u1 and if any Si and S j merge then the expected utility of the new merged group
will be
(
M
2(`+1)
)1−r
· k+2`k+k` = say u2. Now
u1 > u2⇔
( M
`+1
)1−r
· k+ `
k+ k`
>
( M
2(`+1)
)1−r
· k+2`
k+ k`
⇔ 21−r(k+ `)> (k+2`)
⇔ k > `
(2−21−r
21−r−1
)
= ` ·g(21−r)
which follows from Equation 7. So no two of the groups S1,S2, . . . ,Sk will merge.
We next show no player will defect from one group to another. The number of players in the new group
will be `+2 and it will have more coverage if a primary vertex defects rather than a secondary vertex. So it
is enough to prove the defection of a primary vertex to another group is not possible. Suppose the primary
vertex vi defects to join the group S j. The initial expected utility of vi is
(
M
`+1
)1−r
· k+`k+k` = say u3 and the
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expected utility of the group {vi}∪S j is
(
M
`+2
)1−r
· k+2`k+k` = say u4. Now
u3 > u4⇔
( M
`+1
)1−r
· k+ `
k+ k`
>
( M
`+2
)1−r
· k+2`
k+ k`
⇔
(`+2
`+1
)1−r
· (k+ `)> (k+2`)
⇔ f (`) · (k+ `)> (k+2`)
⇔ k > `
(2− f (`)
f (`)−1
)
which holds by Equation 6. Therefore no defection will take place. Since no merging or defection can occur,
the groups S1,S2, . . . ,Sk form a Nash Equilibrium in the graph Gk,`.
Equations 6 and 7 (given in proof of Lemma 6.4) do not impose any absolute upper bounds on k or `.
We use this fact in the following theorem to show for every positive constant c < 1 there exists a graph Gc
and a Nash Equilibrium in Gc such that no group in the Nash Equilibrium covers at least a c-fraction of the
total number of vertices.
Theorem 6.5. Given any positive constant c < 1, under the assumption that defecting to an empty group
is not allowed, there exists a graph Gc and a Nash Equilibrium in Gc such that each group in the Nash
Equilibrium covers strictly less than a c-fraction of the total number of vertices.
Proof. We set Gc to be the graph Gk,` where k, ` will be determined later. Consider the Nash Equilibrium
in Gc given by the groups S1,S2, . . . ,Sk in Lemma 6.4. The fraction of the total number of vertices covered
by any group Si is given by
k+ `
k+ k`
=
1+ `k
1+ `
<
1+ 1γ
1+ `
where the last step follows from Equation 7. Recalling
γ = g(21−r) =
2−21−r
21−r−1 is a constant, we choose ` large enough so c>
1+ 1γ
1+ `
which proves our theorem. We
need to choose k large enough to satisfy Equation 6 but this is not an issue as we do not have any absolute
upper bound constraints on either k or `.
7 Conclusions and Open Problems
In this paper we have suggested a game-theoretic model motivated by the DARPA Network Challenge. We
analyze the structures of the groups in Nash equilibria. We show for various topologies: a one-dimensional
space (line), a d-dimensional Euclidean space, and bounded-degree regular graphs; in any Nash Equilibrium
there always exists a group which covers a constant fraction of the total volume. The objective of events like
the DARPA Network Challenge is to mobilize a large number of people quickly so that they can cover a big
fraction of the total area. Our results suggest that this objective can be met under certain conditions.
However our ideas however do not generalize to all the graphs and we provide explicit examples of
graphs for which our techniques fail. Under an additional assumption that defecting to an empty group is
not allowed, we show given any constant c< 1 there exists a graph Gc and a Nash Equilibrium in Gc where
each group in the Nash Equilibrium covers strictly less than a c-fraction of the total number of vertices.
It would be interesting to prove Theorem 6.5 without the assumption that defecting to an empty group is
prohibited.
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A Omitted Proofs from Section 3
Proof of Theorem 3.1
Proof. Let S be a group which covers volume AS = λA, where A is the total volume. Since each member
of S contributes volume 1 we have |S| ≥ AS ≥ λA ≥ λ 11−r+1A (because λ ∈ (0,1)). If each player in S has
expected utility at least c then c≤ E[u(x)]≤ λ ·
(
M
|S|
)1−r
, which implies
(
M
|S|
)1−r
≥ cλ . So M ≥ |S|( cλ )
1
1−r ≥
λ
1
1−r+1A( cλ )
1
1−r = λAc
1
1−r , proving the lemma.
Proof of Theorem 3.2
Proof. Let S be a group of size k. Then we have N ≥ |S|= k where N is total number of players. Since each
player can contribute at most 1 exclusive volume we have AS ≤ |S| ≤ N where AS is volume covered by S.
If x ∈ S then we have c ≤ E[u(x)] =
(
M
|S|
)1−r
· ASA ≤
(
M
|S|
)1−r
· NA . Therefore we have
(
M
|G|
)1−r
≥ cAN which
implies M ≥ |G|
(
cA
N
) 1
1−r
= k
(
cA
N
) 1
1−r
.
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